source: postlfs/security/firewalling.xml@ b84342d6

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<sect1 id="fw-firewall" xreflabel="Firewalling">
  <?dbhtml filename="firewall.html"?>

  <sect1info>
    <othername>$LastChangedBy$</othername>
    <date>$Date$</date>
  </sect1info>

  <title>Setting Up a Network Firewall</title>

  <para>Before you read this part of the chapter, you should have
  already installed iptables as described in the previous section.</para>

  <sect2 id="fw-intro" xreflabel="Firewalling Introduction">
    <title>Introduction to Firewall Creation</title>

    <para>The general purpose of a firewall is to protect a computer or
    a network against malicious access.</para>

    <para>In a perfect world, every daemon or service on every machine
    is perfectly configured and immune to flaws such as buffer overflows
    or other problems regarding its security. Furthermore, you trust
    every user accessing your services. In this world, you do not need
    to have a firewall.</para>

    <para>In the real world however, daemons may be misconfigured and
    exploits against essential services are freely available. You may
    wish to choose which services are accessible by certain machines or
    you may wish to limit which machines or applications are allowed
    external access. Alternatively, you may simply not trust some of
    your applications or users. You are probably connected to the
    Internet. In this world, a firewall is essential.</para>

    <para>Don't assume however, that having a firewall makes careful
    configuration redundant, or that it makes any negligent
    misconfiguration harmless. It doesn't prevent anyone from exploiting
    a service you intentionally offer but haven't recently updated or
    patched after an exploit went public.  Despite having a firewall, you
    need to keep applications and daemons on your system properly
    configured and up to date.  A firewall is not a cure all, but should
    be an essential part of your overall security strategy.</para>

  </sect2>

  <sect2>
    <title>Meaning of the Word "Firewall"</title>

    <para>The word firewall can have several different meanings.</para>

    <sect3>
      <title><xref linkend="fw-persFw"/></title>

      <para>This is a hardware device or software program commercially sold (or
      offered via freeware) by companies such as Symantec which claims that
      it secures a home or desktop computer connected to the Internet. This
      type of firewall is highly relevant for users who do not know how their
      computers might be accessed via the Internet or how to disable
      that access, especially if they are always online and connected
      via broadband links.</para>

    </sect3>

    <sect3>
      <title><xref linkend="fw-masqRouter"/></title>

      <para>This is a system placed between the Internet and an intranet.
      To minimize the risk of compromising the firewall itself, it should
      generally have only one role&mdash;that of protecting the intranet.
      Although not completely risk free, the tasks of doing the routing and
      IP masquerading (rewriting IP headers of the packets it routes from
      clients with private IP addresses onto the Internet so that they seem
      to come from the firewall itself) are commonly considered relatively
      secure.</para>

    </sect3>

    <sect3>
      <title><xref linkend="fw-busybox"/></title>

      <para>This is often an old computer you may have retired and nearly
      forgotten, performing masquerading or routing functions, but offering
      non-firewall services such as a web-cache or mail.  This may be used
      for home networks, but is not to be considered as secure as a firewall
      only machine because the combination of server and router/firewall on
      one machine raises the complexity of the setup.</para>

    </sect3>

    <sect3>
      <title>Firewall with a Demilitarized Zone [Not Further
      Described Here]</title>

      <para>This box performs masquerading or routing, but grants public
      access to some branch of your network which, because of public IPs
      and a physically separated structure, is essentially a separate
      network with direct Internet access. The servers on this network are
      those which must be easily accessible from both the Internet and
      intranet. The firewall protects both networks. This type of firewall
      has a minimum of three network interfaces.</para>

    </sect3>

    <sect3>
      <title>Packetfilter</title>

      <para>This type of firewall does routing or masquerading, but does
      not maintain a state table of ongoing communication streams. It is
      fast, but quite limited in its ability to block undesired packets
      without blocking desired packets.</para>

    </sect3>

  </sect2>

  <sect2 id="fw-writing" xreflabel="writing the firewalling-setup-scripts">
    <title>Now You Can Start to Build your Firewall</title>

    <caution>
      <para>This introduction on how to setup a firewall is not a
      complete guide to securing systems. Firewalling is a complex
      issue that requires careful configuration. The scripts quoted
      here are simply intended to give examples of how a firewall
      works. They are not intended to fit into any particular
      configuration and may not provide complete protection from
      an attack.</para>

      <para>Customization of these scripts for your specific situation
      will be necessary for an optimal configuration, but you should
      make a serious study of the iptables documentation and creating
      firewalls in general before hacking away. Have a look at the
      list of <xref linkend="fw-library"/> at the end of this section for
      more details. There you will find a list of URLs that contain quite
      comprehensive information about building your own firewall.</para>
    </caution>

    <para>The firewall configuration script installed in the iptables section
    differs from the standard configuration script. It only has two of
    the standard targets: start and status. The other targets are clear
    and lock. For instance if you issue:</para>

<screen role="root"><userinput>/etc/rc.d/init.d/iptables start</userinput></screen>

    <para>the firewall will be restarted just as it is upon system startup.
    The status target will present a list of all currently implemented
    rules. The clear target turns off all firewall rules and the lock
    target will block all packets in and out of the computer with the
    exception of the loopback interface.</para>

    <para>The main startup firewall is located in the file
    <filename>/etc/rc.d/rc.iptables</filename>. The sections below provide
    three different approaches that can be used for a system.</para>

    <note>
      <para>You should always run your firewall rules from a script.
      This ensures consistency and a record of what was done. It also
      allows retention of comments that are essential for understanding
      the rules long after they were written.</para>
    </note>

    <sect3 id="fw-persFw" xreflabel="Personal Firewall">
      <title>Personal Firewall</title>

      <para>A Personal Firewall is designed to let you access all the
      services offered on the Internet, but keep your box secure and
      your data private.</para>

      <para>Below is a slightly modified version of Rusty Russell's
      recommendation from the <ulink
      url="http://www.netfilter.org/documentation/HOWTO/packet-filtering-HOWTO.html">
      Linux 2.4 Packet Filtering HOWTO</ulink>. It is still applicable
      to the Linux 2.6 kernels.</para>

<screen role="root"><?dbfo keep-together="auto"?><userinput>cat &gt; /etc/rc.d/rc.iptables &lt;&lt; "EOF"
<literal>#!/bin/sh

# Begin $rc_base/rc.iptables

# Insert connection-tracking modules
# (not needed if built into the kernel)
modprobe ip_tables
modprobe iptable_filter
modprobe ip_conntrack
modprobe ip_conntrack_ftp
modprobe ipt_state
modprobe ipt_LOG

# Enable broadcast echo Protection
echo 1 &gt; /proc/sys/net/ipv4/icmp_echo_ignore_broadcasts

# Disable Source Routed Packets
echo 0 &gt; /proc/sys/net/ipv4/conf/all/accept_source_route
echo 0 &gt; /proc/sys/net/ipv4/conf/default/accept_source_route

# Enable TCP SYN Cookie Protection
echo 1 &gt; /proc/sys/net/ipv4/tcp_syncookies

# Disable ICMP Redirect Acceptance
echo 0 &gt; /proc/sys/net/ipv4/conf/default/accept_redirects

# Do not send Redirect Messages
echo 0 &gt; /proc/sys/net/ipv4/conf/all/send_redirects
echo 0 &gt; /proc/sys/net/ipv4/conf/default/send_redirects

# Drop Spoofed Packets coming in on an interface, where responses
# would result in the reply going out a different interface.
echo 1 &gt; /proc/sys/net/ipv4/conf/all/rp_filter
echo 1 &gt; /proc/sys/net/ipv4/conf/default/rp_filter

# Log packets with impossible addresses.
echo 1 &gt; /proc/sys/net/ipv4/conf/all/log_martians
echo 1 &gt; /proc/sys/net/ipv4/conf/default/log_martians

# be verbose on dynamic ip-addresses  (not needed in case of static IP)
echo 2 &gt; /proc/sys/net/ipv4/ip_dynaddr

# disable Explicit Congestion Notification
# too many routers are still ignorant
echo 0 &gt; /proc/sys/net/ipv4/tcp_ecn

# Set a known state
iptables -P INPUT   DROP
iptables -P FORWARD DROP
iptables -P OUTPUT  DROP

# These lines are here in case rules are already in place and the
# script is ever rerun on the fly. We want to remove all rules and
# pre-existing user defined chains before we implement new rules.
iptables -F
iptables -X
iptables -Z

iptables -t nat -F

# Allow local-only connections
iptables -A INPUT  -i lo -j ACCEPT

# Free output on any interface to any ip for any service
# (equal to -P ACCEPT)
iptables -A OUTPUT -j ACCEPT

# Permit answers on already established connections
# and permit new connections related to established ones
# (e.g. port mode ftp)
iptables -A INPUT -m state --state ESTABLISHED,RELATED -j ACCEPT

# Log everything else. What's Windows' latest exploitable vulnerability?
iptables -A INPUT -j LOG --log-prefix "FIREWALL:INPUT "

# End $rc_base/rc.iptables</literal>
EOF
chmod 700 /etc/rc.d/rc.iptables</userinput></screen>

      <para>This script is quite simple, it drops all traffic coming
      into your computer that wasn't initiated from your computer, but
      as long as you are simply surfing the Internet you are unlikely
      to exceed its limits.</para>

      <para>If you frequently encounter certain delays at accessing
      FTP servers, take a look at <xref linkend="fw-BB-4"/>.</para>

      <para>Even if you have daemons or services running on your system,
      these will be inaccessible everywhere but from your computer itself.
      If you want to allow access to services on your machine, such as
      <command>ssh</command> or <command>ping</command>, take a look at
      <xref linkend="fw-busybox"/>.</para>

    </sect3>

    <sect3 id="fw-masqRouter" xreflabel="Masquerading Router">
      <title>Masquerading Router</title>

      <para>A true Firewall has two interfaces, one connected to an
      intranet, in this example <emphasis role="strong">eth0</emphasis>,
      and one connected to the Internet, here <emphasis
      role="strong">ppp0</emphasis>. To provide the maximum security
      for the firewall itself, make sure that there are no unnecessary
      servers running on it such as <application>X11</application> et
      al. As a general principle, the firewall itself should not access
      any untrusted service (think of a remote server giving answers that
      makes a daemon on your system crash, or even worse, that implements
      a worm via a buffer-overflow).</para>

<screen role="root"><?dbfo keep-together="auto"?><userinput>cat &gt; /etc/rc.d/rc.iptables &lt;&lt; "EOF"
<literal>#!/bin/sh

# Begin $rc_base/rc.iptables

echo
echo "You're using the example configuration for a setup of a firewall"
echo "from Beyond Linux From Scratch."
echo "This example is far from being complete, it is only meant"
echo "to be a reference."
echo "Firewall security is a complex issue, that exceeds the scope"
echo "of the configuration rules below."
echo "You can find additional information"
echo "about firewalls in Chapter 4 of the BLFS book."
echo "http://www.&lfs-domainname;/blfs"
echo

# Insert iptables modules (not needed if built into the kernel).

modprobe ip_tables
modprobe iptable_filter
modprobe ip_conntrack
modprobe ip_conntrack_ftp
modprobe ipt_state
modprobe iptable_nat
modprobe ip_nat_ftp
modprobe ipt_MASQUERADE
modprobe ipt_LOG
modprobe ipt_REJECT

# Enable broadcast echo Protection
echo 1 &gt; /proc/sys/net/ipv4/icmp_echo_ignore_broadcasts

# Disable Source Routed Packets
echo 0 &gt; /proc/sys/net/ipv4/conf/all/accept_source_route

# Enable TCP SYN Cookie Protection
echo 1 &gt; /proc/sys/net/ipv4/tcp_syncookies

# Disable ICMP Redirect Acceptance
echo 0 &gt; /proc/sys/net/ipv4/conf/all/accept_redirects

# Don't send Redirect Messages
echo 0 &gt; /proc/sys/net/ipv4/conf/default/send_redirects

# Drop Spoofed Packets coming in on an interface where responses
# would result in the reply going out a different interface.
echo 1 &gt; /proc/sys/net/ipv4/conf/default/rp_filter

# Log packets with impossible addresses.
echo 1 &gt; /proc/sys/net/ipv4/conf/all/log_martians

# Be verbose on dynamic ip-addresses  (not needed in case of static IP)
echo 2 &gt; /proc/sys/net/ipv4/ip_dynaddr

# Disable Explicit Congestion Notification
# Too many routers are still ignorant
echo 0 &gt; /proc/sys/net/ipv4/tcp_ecn

# Set a known state
iptables -P INPUT   DROP
iptables -P FORWARD DROP
iptables -P OUTPUT  DROP

# These lines are here in case rules are already in place and the
# script is ever rerun on the fly. We want to remove all rules and
# pre-existing user defined chains before we implement new rules.
iptables -F
iptables -X
iptables -Z

iptables -t nat -F

# Allow local connections
iptables -A INPUT  -i lo -j ACCEPT
iptables -A OUTPUT -o lo -j ACCEPT

# Allow forwarding if the initiated on the intranet
iptables -A FORWARD -m state --state ESTABLISHED,RELATED -j ACCEPT
iptables -A FORWARD  -i ! ppp+ -m state --state NEW      -j ACCEPT

# Do masquerading
# (not needed if intranet is not using private ip-addresses)
iptables -t nat -A POSTROUTING -o ppp+ -j MASQUERADE

# Log everything for debugging
# (last of all rules, but before policy rules)
iptables -A INPUT   -j LOG --log-prefix "FIREWALL:INPUT "
iptables -A FORWARD -j LOG --log-prefix "FIREWALL:FORWARD "
iptables -A OUTPUT  -j LOG --log-prefix "FIREWALL:OUTPUT "

# Enable IP Forwarding
echo 1 &gt; /proc/sys/net/ipv4/ip_forward</literal>
EOF
chmod 700 /etc/rc.d/rc.iptables</userinput></screen>

      <para>With this script your intranet should be reasonably secure
      against external attacks. No one should be able to setup a new
      connection to any internal service and, if it's masqueraded,
      makes your intranet invisible to the Internet. Furthermore, your
      firewall should be relatively safe because there are no services
      running that a cracker could attack.</para>

      <note>
        <para>If the interface you're connecting to the Internet
        doesn't connect via PPP, you will need to change
        <replaceable>&lt;ppp+&gt;</replaceable> to the name of the interface
        (e.g., <emphasis role="strong">eth1</emphasis>) which you are
        using.</para>
      </note>

    </sect3>

    <sect3 id="fw-busybox" xreflabel="BusyBox">
      <title>BusyBox</title>

      <para>This scenario isn't too different from the <xref
      linkend="fw-masqRouter"/>, but additionally offers some
      services to your intranet. Examples of this can be when
      you want to administer your firewall from another host on
      your intranet or use it as a proxy or a name server.</para>

      <note>
        <para>Outlining a true concept of how to protect a server that
        offers services on the Internet goes far beyond the scope of
        this document. See the references at the end of this section
        for more information.</para>
      </note>

      <para>Be cautious. Every service you have enabled makes your
      setup more complex and your firewall less secure. You are
      exposed to the risks of misconfigured services or running
      a service with an exploitable bug. A firewall should generally
      not run any extra services.  See the introduction to the
      <xref linkend="fw-masqRouter"/> for some more details.</para>

      <para>If you want to add services such as internal Samba or
      name servers that do not need to access the Internet themselves,
      the additional statements are quite simple and should still be
      acceptable from a security standpoint. Just add the following lines
      into the script <emphasis>before</emphasis> the logging rules.</para>

<screen><literal>iptables -A INPUT  -i ! ppp+  -j ACCEPT
iptables -A OUTPUT -o ! ppp+  -j ACCEPT</literal></screen>

      <para>If daemons, such as squid, have to access the Internet
      themselves, you could open OUTPUT generally and restrict
      INPUT.</para>

<screen><literal>iptables -A INPUT -m state --state ESTABLISHED,RELATED -j ACCEPT
iptables -A OUTPUT -j ACCEPT</literal></screen>

      <para>However, it is generally not advisable to leave OUTPUT
      unrestricted. You lose any control over trojans who would like
      to "call home", and a bit of redundancy in case you've
      (mis-)configured a service so that it broadcasts its existence
      to the world.</para>

      <para>To accomplish this, you should restrict INPUT and OUTPUT
      on all ports except those that it's absolutely necessary to have
      open. Which ports you have to open depends on your needs: mostly
      you will find them by looking for failed accesses in your log
      files.</para>

      <itemizedlist spacing="compact" role='iptables'>
        <title>Have a Look at the Following Examples:</title>
        <listitem>
          <para>Squid is caching the web:</para>

<screen><literal>iptables -A OUTPUT -p tcp --dport 80 -j ACCEPT
iptables -A INPUT  -p tcp --sport 80 -m state --state ESTABLISHED \
  -j ACCEPT</literal></screen>

        </listitem>
        <listitem>
          <para>Your caching name server (e.g., named) does its
          lookups via UDP:</para>

<screen><literal>iptables -A OUTPUT -p udp --dport 53 -j ACCEPT</literal></screen>

        </listitem>
        <listitem>
          <para>You want to be able to ping your computer to
          ensure it's still alive:</para>

<screen><literal>iptables -A INPUT  -p icmp -m icmp --icmp-type echo-request -j ACCEPT
iptables -A OUTPUT -p icmp -m icmp --icmp-type echo-reply   -j ACCEPT</literal></screen>

        </listitem>
        <listitem>
          <para id='fw-BB-4' xreflabel="BusyBox example number 4">If
          you are frequently accessing FTP servers or enjoy chatting, you might
          notice certain delays because some implementations of these daemons
          have the feature of querying an identd on your system to obtain
          usernames. Although there's really little harm in this, having an
          identd running is not recommended because many security experts feel
          the service gives out too much additional information.</para>

          <para>To avoid these delays you could reject the requests
          with a 'tcp-reset':</para>

<screen><literal>iptables -A INPUT  -p tcp --dport 113 -j REJECT --reject-with tcp-reset</literal></screen>

        </listitem>
        <listitem>
          <para>To log and drop invalid packets (packets
          that came in after netfilter's timeout or some types of
          network scans) insert these rules at the top of the chain:</para>

<screen><literal>iptables -I INPUT 0 -p tcp -m state --state INVALID \
  -j LOG --log-prefix "FIREWALL:INVALID "
iptables -I INPUT 1 -p tcp -m state --state INVALID -j DROP</literal></screen>

        </listitem>
        <listitem>
          <para>Anything coming from the outside should not have a
          private address, this is a common attack called IP-spoofing:</para>

<screen><literal>iptables -A INPUT -i ppp+ -s 10.0.0.0/8     -j DROP
iptables -A INPUT -i ppp+ -s 172.16.0.0/12  -j DROP
iptables -A INPUT -i ppp+ -s 192.168.0.0/16 -j DROP</literal></screen>

          <para>There are other addresses that you may also want to
          drop: 0.0.0.0/8, 127.0.0.0/8, 224.0.0.0/3 (multicast and
          experimental), 169.254.0.0/16 (Link Local Networks), and
          192.0.2.0/24 (IANA defined test network).</para>
        </listitem>
        <listitem>
          <para>If your firewall is a DHCP client, you need to allow
          those packets:</para>

<screen><literal>iptables -A INPUT  -i ppp0 -p udp -s 0.0.0.0 --sport 67 \
   -d 255.255.255.255 --dport 68 -j ACCEPT</literal></screen>

        </listitem>
        <listitem>
          <para>To simplify debugging and be fair to anyone who'd like
          to access a service you have disabled, purposely or by mistake,
          you could REJECT those packets that are dropped.</para>

          <para>Obviously this must be done directly after logging as the very
          last lines before the packets are dropped by policy:</para>

<screen><literal>iptables -A INPUT -j REJECT</literal></screen>

        </listitem>
      </itemizedlist>

      <para>These are only examples to show you some of the capabilities
      of the firewall code in Linux. Have a look at the man page of iptables.
      There you will find much more information. The port numbers needed for
      this can be found in <filename>/etc/services</filename>, in case you
      didn't find them by trial and error in your log file.</para>

    </sect3>

  </sect2>

  <sect2 id="fw-finale" xreflabel="Conclusion">
    <title>Conclusion</title>

    <para>Finally, there is one fact you must not forget: The effort spent
    attacking a system corresponds to the value the cracker expects to gain
    from it. If you are responsible for valuable information, you need to
    spend the time to protect it properly.</para>

  </sect2>

  <sect2 id="postlfs-security-fw-extra" xreflabel="Extra Information">
    <title>Extra Information</title>

    <sect3 id="fw-library" xreflabel="links for further reading">
      <title>Where to Start with Further Reading on Firewalls</title>

      <blockquote>
        <literallayout>
<ulink url="http://www.netfilter.org/">www.netfilter.org - Homepage of the netfilter/iptables project</ulink>
<ulink url="http://www.netfilter.org/documentation/FAQ/netfilter-faq.html">Netfilter related FAQ</ulink>
<ulink url="http://www.netfilter.org/documentation/index.html#HOWTO">Netfilter related HOWTO's</ulink>
<ulink url="http://en.tldp.org/LDP/nag2/x-087-2-firewall.html">en.tldp.org/LDP/nag2/x-087-2-firewall.html</ulink>
<ulink url="http://en.tldp.org/HOWTO/Security-HOWTO.html">en.tldp.org/HOWTO/Security-HOWTO.html</ulink>
<ulink url="http://en.tldp.org/HOWTO/Firewall-HOWTO.html">en.tldp.org/HOWTO/Firewall-HOWTO.html</ulink>
<ulink url="http://www.linuxsecurity.com/docs/">www.linuxsecurity.com/docs/</ulink>
<ulink url="http://www.little-idiot.de/firewall">www.little-idiot.de/firewall (German &amp; outdated, but very comprehensive)</ulink>
<ulink url="http://linux.oreillynet.com/pub/a/linux/2000/03/10/netadmin/ddos.html">linux.oreillynet.com/pub/a/linux/2000/03/10/netadmin/ddos.html</ulink>
<ulink url="http://staff.washington.edu/dittrich/misc/ddos">staff.washington.edu/dittrich/misc/ddos</ulink>
<ulink url="http://www.e-infomax.com/ipmasq">www.e-infomax.com/ipmasq</ulink>
<ulink url="http://www.circlemud.org/~jelson/writings/security/index.htm">www.circlemud.org/~jelson/writings/security/index.htm</ulink>
<ulink url="http://www.securityfocus.com">www.securityfocus.com</ulink>
<ulink url="http://www.cert.org/tech_tips/">www.cert.org - tech_tips</ulink>
<ulink url="http://security.ittoolbox.com/">security.ittoolbox.com</ulink>
<ulink url="http://www.insecure.org/reading.html">www.insecure.org/reading.html</ulink>
        </literallayout>
      </blockquote>

      <!-- The following are all dead links from the section above. They are
           moved out of the section so the literallayout won't produce blank
           lines in the rendered text

<ulink url="http://www-106.ibm.com/developerworks/security/library/s-fire.html">www.ibm.com/developerworks/security/library/s-fire.html</ulink>
<ulink url="http://www-106.ibm.com/developerworks/security/library/s-fire2.html">www.ibm.com/developerworks/security/library/s-fire2.html</ulink>
<ulink url="http://www.interhack.net/pubs/fw-faq/">www.interhack.net/pubs/fw-faq/</ulink>
<ulink url="http://www.linuxgazette.com/issue65/stumpel.html">www.linuxgazette.com/issue65/stumpel.html</ulink>
<ulink url="http://www.linux-firewall-tools.com/linux/">www.linux-firewall-tools.com/linux/</ulink>
<ulink url="http://logi.cc/linux/athome-firewall.php3">logi.cc/linux/athome-firewall.php3</ulink>
<ulink url="http://www.robertgraham.com/pubs/firewall-seen.html">www.robertgraham.com/pubs/firewall-seen.html</ulink>

      -->

    </sect3>

  </sect2>

</sect1>