#13330 closed enhancement (fixed)
bubblewrap-0.4.1
| Reported by: | Bruce Dubbs | Owned by: | Douglas R. Reno |
|---|---|---|---|
| Priority: | high | Milestone: | 10.0 |
| Component: | BOOK | Version: | SVN |
| Severity: | normal | Keywords: | |
| Cc: |
Description
New point version.
Change History (5)
comment:1 by , 6 years ago
| Owner: | changed from to |
|---|---|
| Status: | new → assigned |
comment:2 by , 6 years ago
| Priority: | normal → high |
|---|
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Release Notes
This release fixes a privilege escalation bug pointed out by Stephen Röttger, where in some setups bubblewrap can be used to gain root permissions. Only version 0.4.0 is vulnerable, and only if installed setuid while at the same time the kernel supports unprivileged user namespaces. More details in the advisory here: GHSA-j2qp-rvxj-43vj Additionally there are some minor changes: Always clear the capability bounding set (cosmetic issue) Make the tests work with libcap >= 2.29 Properly report child exit status in some cases Alexander Larsson (9): Ensure we're always clearing the cap bounding set Don't rely on geteuid() to know when to switch back from setuid root Don't support --userns2 in setuid mode drop_privs: More explicit argument name Christian Kastner (1): tests: Update output patterns for libcap >= 2.29 Jean-Baptiste BESNARD (1): retcode: fix return code with syncfd and no event_fd TomSweeneyRedHat (1): Add Code of ConductSecurity Advisory
Severity high Packages bwrap Affected versions 0.4.0 (setuid mode) Patched versions 0.4.1 CVE identifier CVE-2020-5291 Impact If bubblewrap is installed in setuid mode and the kernel supports unprivileged user namespaces, then the bwrap --userns2 option can be used to make the setuid process keep running as root while being traceable. This can in turn be used to gain root permissions. Note that this only affects the combination of bubblewrap in setuid mode (which is typically used when unprivileged user namespaces are not supported) and the support of unprivileged user namespaces. Known to be affected are: Debian testing/unstable, if unprivileged user namespaces enabled (not default) Debian buster-backports, if unprivileged user namespaces enabled (not default) Arch if using linux-hardened, if unprivileged user namespaces enabled (not default) Centos 7 flatpak COPR, if unprivileged user namespaces enabled (not default) Patches This has been fixed in the 0.4.1 release, and all affected users should update. Workarounds Kernels after 4.9 supports limiting unprivileged user namespaces by setting /proc/sys/user/max_user_namespaces to 0. In fact, some systems, such as RHEL7 set this by default. This setting mitigates the vulnerability. Some patched kernels, such as the linux package in Debian and the linux-hardened package in Arch Linux, support disabling unprivileged creation of user namespaces by setting /proc/sys/kernel/unprivileged_userns_clone to 0. This is done by default in some distributions such as Debian, and also mitigates the vulnerability.