Opened 3 years ago
Closed 3 years ago
#15987 closed enhancement (fixed)
samba-4.15.5
Reported by: | Bruce Dubbs | Owned by: | Douglas R. Reno |
---|---|---|---|
Priority: | high | Milestone: | 11.1 |
Component: | BOOK | Version: | git |
Severity: | normal | Keywords: | |
Cc: |
Description ¶
New point version.
Change History (8)
comment:2 by , 3 years ago
Owner: | changed from | to
---|---|
Status: | new → assigned |
comment:3 by , 3 years ago
Priority: | normal → elevated |
---|---|
Summary: | samba-4.15.4 → samba-4.15.5 |
Now 4.15.5 with security fixes
comment:4 by , 3 years ago
============================== Release Notes for Samba 4.15.5 January 31, 2022 ============================== This is a security release in order to address the following defects: o CVE-2021-44141: UNIX extensions in SMB1 disclose whether the outside target of a symlink exists. https://www.samba.org/samba/security/CVE-2021-44141.html o CVE-2021-44142: Out-of-Bound Read/Write on Samba vfs_fruit module. https://www.samba.org/samba/security/CVE-2021-44142.html o CVE-2022-0336: Re-adding an SPN skips subsequent SPN conflict checks. https://www.samba.org/samba/security/CVE-2022-0336.html Changes since 4.15.4 -------------------- o Jeremy Allison <jra@samba.org> * BUG 14911: CVE-2021-44141 o Ralph Boehme <slow@samba.org> * BUG 14914: CVE-2021-44142 o Joseph Sutton <josephsutton@catalyst.net.nz> * BUG 14950: CVE-2022-0336
comment:5 by , 3 years ago
CVE-2021-44141
CVE-2021-44141.html: =========================================================== == Subject: Information leak via symlinks of existance of == files or directories outside of the exported == share. == == CVE ID#: CVE-2021-44141 == == == Versions: All versions of the Samba file server prior to == 4.15.5. == == Summary: A client can use a symlink to discover if a named == or directory exists on the filesystem outside of == the exported share. The user must have permissions == to query a symlink inside the exported share using == SMB1 with unix extensions turned on. =========================================================== =========== Description =========== All versions of Samba prior to 4.15.5 are vulnerable to a malicious client using a server symlink to determine if a file or directory exists in an area of the server file system not exported under the share definition. SMB1 with unix extensions has to be enabled in order for this attack to succeed. Clients that have write access to the exported part of the file system under a share via SMB1 unix extensions or via NFS can create symlinks that point to arbitrary files or directories on the server filesystem. Clients can then use SMB1 unix extension information queries to determine if the target of the symlink exists or not by examining error codes returned from the smbd server. There is no ability to access these files or directories, only to determine if they exist or not. If SMB1 is turned off and only SMB2 is used, or unix extensions are not enabled then there is no way to discover if a symlink points to a valid target or not via SMB2. For this reason, even if symlinks are created via NFS, if the Samba server does not allow SMB1 with unix extensions there is no way to exploit this bug. Finding out what files or directories exist on a file server can help attackers guess system user names or the exact operating system release and applications running on the server hosting Samba which may help mount further attacks. SMB1 has been disabled on Samba since version 4.11.0 and onwards. Exploitation of this bug has not been seen in the wild. ================== Patch Availability ================== Patches addressing this issue has been posted to: https://www.samba.org/samba/security/ Samba version 4.15.5 has been issued as a security release to correct the defect. Samba administrators are advised to upgrade to this release as soon as possible. Due to the complexity of the fixes needed for this problem, back ports to earlier Samba versions have not been provided. For users of earlier Samba versions, please see the "Workaround and mitigating factors" section of this document. ================== CVSSv3.1 calculation ================== CVSS:AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N/E:P/RL:O/RC:C/CR:L/IR:L/AR:L/MAV:N/MAC:L/MPR:L/MUI:N/MS:U/MC:H/MI:N/MA:N base score of 4.2 ================================= Workaround and mitigating factors ================================= Do not enable SMB1 (please note SMB1 is disabled by default in Samba from version 4.11.0 and onwards). This prevents the creation or querying of symbolic links via SMB1. If SMB1 must be enabled for backwards compatibility then add the parameter: unix extensions = no to the [global] section of your smb.conf and restart smbd. This prevents SMB1 clients from creating or reading symlinks on the exported file system. However, if the same region of the file system is also exported allowing write access via NFS, NFS clients can create symlinks that allow SMB1 with unix extensions clients to discover the existance of the NFS created symlink targets. For non-patched versions of Samba we recommend only exporting areas of the file system by either SMB2 or NFS, not both. ======= Credits ======= Reported by Stefan Behrens of Jeremy Allison of Google and the Samba Team provided the fix. ========================================================== == Our Code, Our Bugs, Our Responsibility. == The Samba Team ==========================================================
comment:6 by , 3 years ago
Priority: | elevated → high |
---|
CVE-2021-44142
CVE-2021-44142.html: ================================================================= == Subject: Out-of-bounds heap read/write vulnerability == in VFS module vfs_fruit allows code execution == == CVE ID#: CVE-2021-44142 == == Versions: All versions of Samba prior to 4.13.17 == == Summary: This vulnerability allows remote attackers to == execute arbitrary code as root on affected Samba == installations that use the VFS module vfs_fruit. ================================================================= =========== Description =========== All versions of Samba prior to 4.13.17 are vulnerable to an out-of-bounds heap read write vulnerability that allows remote attackers to execute arbitrary code as root on affected Samba installations that use the VFS module vfs_fruit. The specific flaw exists within the parsing of EA metadata when opening files in smbd. Access as a user that has write access to a file's extended attributes is required to exploit this vulnerability. Note that this could be a guest or unauthenticated user if such users are allowed write access to file extended attributes. The problem in vfs_fruit exists in the default configuration of the fruit VFS module using fruit:metadata=netatalk or fruit:resource=file. If both options are set to different settings than the default values, the system is not affected by the security issue. ================== Patch Availability ================== Patches addressing both these issues have been posted to: https://www.samba.org/samba/security/ Additionally, Samba 4.13.17, 4.14.12 and 4.15.5 have been issued as security releases to correct the defect. Samba administrators are advised to upgrade to these releases or apply the patch as soon as possible. ================== CVSSv3 calculation ================== CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H/E:F/RL:O/RC:C Base score 9.9. ========== Workaround ========== As a workaround remove the "fruit" VFS module from the list of configured VFS objects in any "vfs objects" line in the Samba configuration smb.conf. Note that changing the VFS module settings fruit:metadata or fruit:resource to use the unaffected setting causes all stored information to be inaccessible and will make it appear to macOS clients as if the information is lost. ======= Credits ======= Originally reported by Orange Tsai from DEVCORE. Nguyen Hoang Thach and Billy Jheng Bing-Jhong of STAR Labs working with Trend Micro Zero Day Initiative Lucas Leong of Trend Micro Zero Day Initiative Patches provided by Ralph Böhme of the Samba team. ========================================================== == Our Code, Our Bugs, Our Responsibility. == The Samba Team ==========================================================
Ouch, that's a 9.9/10. Promoting to High from Elevated.
comment:7 by , 3 years ago
CVE-2022-0336
CVE-2022-0336.html: =========================================================== == Subject: Samba AD users with permission to write to == an account can impersonate arbitrary services. == == CVE ID#: CVE-2022-0336 == == Versions: Samba 4.0.0 and later == == Summary: Checks in the Samba AD DC to prevent aliased == SPNs could be bypassed, giving users who can == write to an account's servicePrincipalName == attribute the ability to impersonate services. =========================================================== =========== Description =========== The Samba AD DC includes checks when adding service principals names (SPNs) to an account to ensure that SPNs do not alias with those already in the database. Some of these checks are able to be bypassed if an account modification re-adds an SPN that was previously present on that account, such as one added when a computer is joined to a domain. An attacker who has the ability to write to an account can exploit this to perform a denial-of-service attack by adding an SPN that matches an existing service. Additionally, an attacker who can intercept traffic can impersonate existing services, resulting in a loss of confidentiality and integrity. ================== Patch Availability ================== Patches addressing both these issues have been posted to: https://www.samba.org/samba/security/ Additionally, Samba 4.13.17, 4.14.12, and 4.15.4 have been issued as security releases to correct the defect. Samba administrators are advised to upgrade to these releases or apply the patch as soon as possible. ================== CVSSv3 calculation ================== CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H (8.8) ========== Workaround ========== None. ======= Credits ======= Originally reported by Kees van Vloten. Analysis, patches, and this advisory by Joseph Sutton of Catalyst and the Samba Team. ========================================================== == Our Code, Our Bugs, Our Responsibility. == The Samba Team ==========================================================
comment:8 by , 3 years ago
Resolution: | → fixed |
---|---|
Status: | assigned → closed |
Note:
See TracTickets
for help on using tickets.