ntp-4.2.8p6

[Fernando de Oliveira]

Security Fixes

CVE-2015-7973
CVE-2015-7974
CVE-2015-7975
CVE-2015-7976
CVE-2015-7977
CVE-2015-7978
CVE-2015-7979
CVE-2015-8138
CVE-2015-8158 

​https://www.eecis.udel.edu/~ntp/ntp_spool/ntp4/ntp-4.2/ntp-4.2.8p6.tar.gz

​https://www.eecis.udel.edu/~ntp/ntp_spool/ntp4/ntp-4.2/ntp-4.2.8p6.tar.gz.md5

60049f51e9c8305afe30eb22b711c5c6 ntp-4.2.8p6.tar.gz

​http://bk1.ntp.org/ntp-stable/NEWS

NTP 4.2.8p6

Focus: Security, Bug fixes, enhancements.

Severity: MEDIUM

In addition to bug fixes and enhancements, this release fixes the
following X low- and Y medium-severity vulnerabilities:

* Potential Infinite Loop in 'ntpq'
   Date Resolved: Stable (4.2.8p6) 19 Jan 2016; Dev (4.3.90) 19 Jan 2016
   References: Sec 2548 / CVE-2015-8158
   Affects: All ntp-4 releases up to, but not including 4.2.8p6, and
        4.3.0 up to, but not including 4.3.90
   CVSS2: (AV:N/AC:M/Au:N/C:N/I:N/A:P) Base Score: 4.3 - MEDIUM
   CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:N Base Score: 5.3 - MEDIUM
   Summary: 'ntpq' processes incoming packets in a loop in 'getresponse()'.
        The loop's only stopping conditions are receiving a complete and
        correct response or hitting a small number of error conditions.
        If the packet contains incorrect values that don't trigger one of
        the error conditions, the loop continues to receive new packets.
        Note well, this is an attack against an instance of 'ntpq', not
        'ntpd', and this attack requires the attacker to do one of the
        following:
        * Own a malicious NTP server that the client trusts
        * Prevent a legitimate NTP server from sending packets to
            the 'ntpq' client
        * MITM the 'ntpq' communications between the 'ntpq' client
            and the NTP server
   Mitigation:
        Upgrade to 4.2.8p6, or later, from the NTP Project Download Page
        or the NTP Public Services Project Download Page
   Credit: This weakness was discovered by Jonathan Gardner of Cisco ASIG.

* 0rigin: Zero Origin Timestamp Bypass
   Date Resolved: Stable (4.2.8p6) 19 Jan 2016; Dev (4.3.90) 19 Jan 2016
   References: Sec 2945 / CVE-2015-8138
   Affects: All ntp-4 releases up to, but not including 4.2.8p6, and
        4.3.0 up to, but not including 4.3.90
   CVSS2: (AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:N/I:P/A:N) Base Score: 5.0 - MEDIUM
   CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:N Base Score: 5.3 - MEDIUM
        (3.7 - LOW if you score AC:L)
   Summary: To distinguish legitimate peer responses from forgeries, a
        client attempts to verify a response packet by ensuring that the
        origin timestamp in the packet matches the origin timestamp it
        transmitted in its last request.  A logic error exists that
        allows packets with an origin timestamp of zero to bypass this
        check whenever there is not an outstanding request to the server.
   Mitigation:
        Configure 'ntpd' to get time from multiple sources.
        Upgrade to 4.2.8p6, or later, from the NTP Project Download Page
            or the NTP Public Services Project Download Page.
        Monitor your 'ntpd= instances.
   Credit: This weakness was discovered by Jonathan Gardner of Cisco ASIG.

* Stack exhaustion in recursive traversal of restriction list
   Date Resolved: Stable (4.2.8p6) 19 Jan 2016
   References: Sec 2940 / CVE-2015-7978
   Affects: All ntp-4 releases up to, but not including 4.2.8p6, and
        4.3.0 up to, but not including 4.3.90
   CVSS: (AV:N/AC:M/Au:N/C:N/I:N/A:P) Base Score: 4.3 - MEDIUM
   Summary: An unauthenticated 'ntpdc reslist' command can cause a
        segmentation fault in ntpd by exhausting the call stack.
   Mitigation:
        Implement BCP-38.
        Upgrade to 4.2.8p6, or later, from the NTP Project Download Page
            or the NTP Public Services Project Download Page.
        If you are unable to upgrade:
            In ntp-4.2.8, mode 7 is disabled by default. Don't enable it.
            If you must enable mode 7:
              configure the use of a 'requestkey' to control who can
                  issue mode 7 requests.
              configure 'restrict noquery' to further limit mode 7
                  requests to trusted sources.
              Monitor your ntpd instances.
   Credit: This weakness was discovered by Stephen Gray at Cisco ASIG.

* Off-path Denial of Service (!DoS) attack on authenticated broadcast mode
   Date Resolved: Stable (4.2.8p6) 19 Jan 2016; Dev (4.3.90) 19 Jan 2016
   References: Sec 2942 / CVE-2015-7979
   Affects: All ntp-4 releases up to, but not including 4.2.8p6, and
        4.3.0 up to, but not including 4.3.90
   CVSS: (AV:N/AC:M/Au:N/C:N/I:P/A:P) Base Score: 5.8
   Summary: An off-path attacker can send broadcast packets with bad
        authentication (wrong key, mismatched key, incorrect MAC, etc)
        to broadcast clients. It is observed that the broadcast client
        tears down the association with the broadcast server upon
        receiving just one bad packet.
   Mitigation:
        Implement BCP-38.
        Upgrade to 4.2.8p6, or later, from the NTP Project Download Page
        or the NTP Public Services Project Download Page.
        Monitor your 'ntpd' instances.
        If this sort of attack is an active problem for you, you have
            deeper problems to investigate.  In this case also consider
            having smaller NTP broadcast domains.
   Credit: This weakness was discovered by Aanchal Malhotra of Boston
        University.

* reslist NULL pointer dereference
   Date Resolved: Stable (4.2.8p6) 19 Jan 2016; Dev (4.3.90) 19 Jan 2016
   References: Sec 2939 / CVE-2015-7977
   Affects: All ntp-4 releases up to, but not including 4.2.8p6, and
        4.3.0 up to, but not including 4.3.90
   CVSS: (AV:N/AC:M/Au:N/C:N/I:N/A:P) Base Score: 4.3 - MEDIUM
   Summary: An unauthenticated 'ntpdc reslist' command can cause a
        segmentation fault in ntpd by causing a NULL pointer dereference.
   Mitigation:
        Implement BCP-38.
        Upgrade to 4.2.8p6, or later, from NTP Project Download Page or
        the NTP Public Services Project Download Page.
        If you are unable to upgrade:
            mode 7 is disabled by default.  Don't enable it.
            If you must enable mode 7:
                configure the use of a 'requestkey' to control who can
                    issue mode 7 requests.
                configure 'restrict noquery' to further limit mode 7
                    requests to trusted sources. 
        Monitor your ntpd instances.
   Credit: This weakness was discovered by Stephen Gray of Cisco ASIG.

* 'ntpq saveconfig' command allows dangerous characters in filenames.
   Date Resolved: Stable (4.2.8p6) 19 Jan 2016; Dev (4.3.90) 19 Jan 2016
   References: Sec 2938 / CVE-2015-7976
   Affects: All ntp-4 releases up to, but not including 4.2.8p6, and
        4.3.0 up to, but not including 4.3.90
   CVSS: (AV:N/AC:L/Au:S/C:N/I:P/A:N) Base Score: 4.0 - MEDIUM
   Summary: The ntpq saveconfig command does not do adequate filtering
        of special characters from the supplied filename.
        Note well: The ability to use the saveconfig command is controlled
        by the 'restrict nomodify' directive, and the recommended default
        configuration is to disable this capability.  If the ability to
        execute a 'saveconfig' is required, it can easily (and should) be
        limited and restricted to a known small number of IP addresses.
   Mitigation:
        Implement BCP-38.
        use 'restrict default nomodify' in your 'ntp.conf' file.
        Upgrade to 4.2.8p6, or later, from the NTP Project Download Page.
        If you are unable to upgrade:
            build NTP with 'configure --disable-saveconfig' if you will
                never need this capability, or
            use 'restrict default nomodify' in your 'ntp.conf' file.  Be
                careful about what IPs have the ability to send 'modify'
                requests to 'ntpd'.
        Monitor your ntpd instances.
        'saveconfig' requests are logged to syslog - monitor your syslog files.
   Credit: This weakness was discovered by Jonathan Gardner of Cisco ASIG.

* nextvar() missing length check in ntpq
   Date Resolved: Stable (4.2.8p6) 19 Jan 2016; Dev (4.3.90) 19 Jan 2016
   References: Sec 2937 / CVE-2015-7975
   Affects: All ntp-4 releases up to, but not including 4.2.8p6, and
        4.3.0 up to, but not including 4.3.90
   CVSS: (AV:L/AC:H/Au:N/C:N/I:N/A:P) Base Score: 1.2 - LOW
        If you score A:C, this becomes 4.0.
   CVSSv3: (CVSS:3.0/AV:L/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:L) Base Score 2.9, LOW
   Summary: ntpq may call nextvar() which executes a memcpy() into the
        name buffer without a proper length check against its maximum
        length of 256 bytes. Note well that we're taking about ntpq here.
        The usual worst-case effect of this vulnerability is that the
        specific instance of ntpq will crash and the person or process
        that did this will have stopped themselves.
   Mitigation:
        Upgrade to 4.2.8p6, or later, from the NTP Project Download Page
            or the NTP Public Services Project Download Page.
        If you are unable to upgrade:
            If you have scripts that feed input to ntpq make sure there are
                some sanity checks on the input received from the "outside".
            This is potentially more dangerous if ntpq is run as root. 
   Credit: This weakness was discovered by Jonathan Gardner at Cisco ASIG.

* Skeleton Key: Any trusted key system can serve time
   Date Resolved: Stable (4.2.8p6) 19 Jan 2016; Dev (4.3.90) 19 Jan 2016
   References: Sec 2936 / CVE-2015-7974
   Affects: All ntp-4 releases up to, but not including 4.2.8p6, and
        4.3.0 up to, but not including 4.3.90
   CVSS: (AV:N/AC:H/Au:S/C:N/I:C/A:N) Base Score: 4.9
   Summary: Symmetric key encryption uses a shared trusted key. The
        reported title for this issue was "Missing key check allows
        impersonation between authenticated peers" and the report claimed
        "A key specified only for one server should only work to
        authenticate that server, other trusted keys should be refused."
        Except there has never been any correlation between this trusted
        key and server v. clients machines and there has never been any
        way to specify a key only for one server. We have treated this as
        an enhancement request, and ntp-4.2.8p6 includes other checks and
        tests to strengthen clients against attacks coming from broadcast
        servers.
   Mitigation:
        Implement BCP-38.
        If this scenario represents a real or a potential issue for you,
            upgrade to 4.2.8p6, or later, from the NTP Project Download
            Page or the NTP Public Services Project Download Page, and
            use the new field in the ntp.keys file that specifies the list
            of IPs that are allowed to serve time. Note that this alone
            will not protect against time packets with forged source IP
            addresses, however other changes in ntp-4.2.8p6 provide
            significant mitigation against broadcast attacks. MITM attacks
            are a different story.
        If you are unable to upgrade:
            Don't use broadcast mode if you cannot monitor your client
              servers.
            If you choose to use symmetric keys to authenticate time
              packets in a hostile environment where ephemeral time
              servers can be created, or if it is expected that malicious
              time servers will participate in an NTP broadcast domain,
              limit the number of participating systems that participate
              in the shared-key group. 
        Monitor your ntpd instances. 
   Credit: This weakness was discovered by Matt Street of Cisco ASIG. 

* Deja Vu: Replay attack on authenticated broadcast mode
   Date Resolved: Stable (4.2.8p6) 19 Jan 2016; Dev (4.3.90) 19 Jan 2016
   References: Sec 2935 / CVE-2015-7973
   Affects: All ntp-4 releases up to, but not including 4.2.8p6, and
        4.3.0 up to, but not including 4.3.90
   CVSS: (AV:A/AC:M/Au:N/C:N/I:P/A:P) Base Score: 4.3 - MEDIUM
   Summary: If an NTP network is configured for broadcast operations then
        either a man-in-the-middle attacker or a malicious participant
        that has the same trusted keys as the victim can replay time packets.
   Mitigation:
        Implement BCP-38.
        Upgrade to 4.2.8p6, or later, from the NTP Project Download Page
            or the NTP Public Services Project Download Page.
        If you are unable to upgrade:
            Don't use broadcast mode if you cannot monitor your client servers.
        Monitor your ntpd instances.
   Credit: This weakness was discovered by Aanchal Malhotra of Boston
        University.

Other fixes:

* [Bug 2772] adj_systime overflows tv_usec. perlinger@ntp.org
* [Bug 2814] msyslog deadlock when signaled. perlinger@ntp.org
  - applied patch by shenpeng11@huawei.com with minor adjustments
* [Bug 2882] Look at ntp_request.c:list_peers_sum(). perlinger@ntp.org
* [Bug 2891] Deadlock in deferred DNS lookup framework. perlinger@ntp.org
* [Bug 2892] Several test cases assume IPv6 capabilities even when
             IPv6 is disabled in the build. perlinger@ntp.org
  - Found this already fixed, but validation led to cleanup actions.
* [Bug 2905] DNS lookups broken. perlinger@ntp.org
  - added limits to stack consumption, fixed some return code handling
* [Bug 2971] ntpq bails on ^C: select fails: Interrupted system call
  - changed stacked/nested handling of CTRL-C. perlinger@ntp.org
  - make CTRL-C work for retrieval and printing od MRU list. perlinger@ntp.org
* [Bug 2980] reduce number of warnings. perlinger@ntp.org
  - integrated several patches from Havard Eidnes (he@uninett.no)
* [Bug 2985] bogus calculation in authkeys.c perlinger@ntp.org
  - implement 'auth_log2()' using integer bithack instead of float calculation
* Make leapsec_query debug messages less verbose.  Harlan Stenn.

---

[Fernando de Oliveira]

Fixed at r16828.